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ABSTRACT 
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union 
(EU) in 2007 offers significant theoretical and empirical insights into 
the way in which the EU has deployed and realised its enlargement 
strategy/strategies over the past 15 years.  Borrowing from the 
literature on enlargement-led Europeanisation and EU 
conditionality, this article discusses how the EU has sought to 
influence domestic reform in the two countries through a mix of 
threats and rewards. What emerges from Bulgaria’s and Romania’s 
trajectory towards EU membership is the evolutionary and contested 
nature of EU conditionality as well as the considerable EU discretion 
in the manner of its implementation. In that sense Bulgaria and 
Romania, as ‘outliers’ of the 2004-7 EU enlargement, offer us critical 
tests of the enlargement-led Europeanisation thesis. Thus, their 
study provides useful conceptual insights into the transformative 
power of the EU in Eastern Europe and highlights important policy 
legacies affecting the current EU enlargement strategy in the 
Western Balkans and Turkey. 
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Between Enlargement-led Europeanisation and Balkan 
Exceptionalism: an appraisal of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s entry 
into the European Union 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Whilst often regarded as the ‘procedural’ conclusion of the 2004 enlargement 
round, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union (EU) in 
2007 offers significant theoretical and empirical insights into the way in which 
the EU has deployed and realised its enlargement strategy/strategies over the 
past 15 years. Ever since their turbulent transition to democracy in the early 
1990s, the two countries have experienced a difficult relation with the EU. For 
officials in Brussels the slow pace of democratic consolidation and domestic 
economic reform has been a regular source of frustration, necessitating the 
enactment of special measures to account for the ‘Balkan exceptionalism’ of 
the two candidates. Naturally all attempts to differentiate Bulgaria and 
Romania from the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been 
met with fierce opposition in Sofia and Bucharest where political elites have 
found it difficult to reconcile their pro-European rhetoric with the 
implementation of a reform agenda capable of meeting the considerable 
conditionalities attached to the enlargement process.  
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Conceptually, the position of Bulgaria and Romania as ‘outliers’ in the process 
of the EU’s eastwards  enlargement offers a critical test case to the thesis of 
enlargement-led Europeanisation.  It also points to the significance of domestic 
mediating factors that condition the transformational impact of the EU and 
have produced divergent reform trajectories across Central and Eastern Europe. 
In policy terms, too, the imperative of dealing with ‘outliers’ (and more 
generally with the significant degree of diversity amongst accession candidates) 
underlines the highly contingent and evolutionary nature of the EU’s 
enlargement strategy. The word ‘strategy’ is used here with a degree of caution 
for, ever since its inception in the early 1990s, the EU’s approach vis-à-vis its 
accession hopefuls has been built upon an uncomfortable dualism: on the one 
hand the building of a rule-governed process structured around the principle of 
conditionality and, on the other, the preservation of a significant element of 
discretion about the interpretation and implementation of these rules.  
The position of the Commission in this process - both as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ 
(Kingdon, 1984) on enlargement and as the arbitrator of the ‘rules of the game’ 
- has been crucially important. From an early stage the Commission assumed a 
key role in driving the enlargement agenda forward against the backdrop of 
internal EU divisions (over the pace and scope of the process) as well a rapidly 
changing geopolitical context involving, amongst others, the wars of succession 
in the former Yugoslavia and NATO enlargement. Under these circumstances 
the Commission was called to exercise discretion that went well beyond the 
bureaucratic oversight of the accession negotiations and deployed a different 
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mix of rewards and punishments for each candidate country. Naturally the 
premises and implications of such discretion acquired far greater significance 
for ‘marginal candidates’ on the edges of the enlargement process. By tracing 
the key components of the EU’s response to the Bulgarian and Romanian 
membership ambitions, this article does not simply shed light on facets of an 
EU enlargement round that is now confined to history. The contemporary 
relevance of previous EU attempts to deal with ‘Balkan exceptionalism’ 
remains pertinent as the policy legacies of the 2007 enlargement continue to 
shape the context in which current and forthcoming accession hopefuls pursue 
their own ‘return to Europe’.  
This article is structured in three parts. The first part revisits the literature of 
enlargement-led Europeanisation and discusses the ‘added value’ offered by the 
experiences of the 2007 enlargement. The second part discusses aspects of 
differentiation and policy-learning evident in the EU’s strategy vis-à-vis 
Bulgaria and Romania since the early 1990s. The third part articulates the 
policy legacies of the Bulgarian and Romanian accession into the EU and their 
likely implications for the membership prospects of other enlargement 
candidates from the wider Balkans. 
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2. Revisiting Conditionality-led Europeanisation in the context of the 
EU’s 2004-07 Enlargement 
One of the most distinguishing features of the recently completed round of EU 
enlargement has been the demand for the adoption by the candidate countries 
of an unprecedented volume of EU-inspired rules. The very nature of the 
accession negotiations (structured around the need for full compliance with the 
EU’s acquis communautaire) coupled with their extremely tight timeframe and 
profound power asymmetries between the negotiating parties have unleashed a 
massive pressure for domestic adaptation across Central and Eastern Europe. 
This process has often been referred to as ‘Europeanisation’. Initially the term 
was used to describe the way in which the experience of EU membership 
affected ‘the organisational logic of national politics and policy making’ in the 
member states (Ladrech, 1994, 69). Radaelli speaks of Europeanisation as a 
process of ‘construction, diffusion and institutionalisation’ of EU rules that 
shape ‘domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies’ 
(Radaelli, 2003, 30). Owing to its rapid expansion over the past decade, the 
literature on Europeanisation offers us today a bewildering array of 
perspectives, ranging from case-specific manifestations of Europeanisation 
dynamics (e.g. Börzel, 1999) to more general conceptualisations on the nature 
of the interactivity between European and national levels (e.g. Cowles et al 
2001; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005) and the mechanisms through which 
Europeanisation impacts on domestic politics (e.g. Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999).   
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More recently conceptualisations of Europeanisation as an ‘export’ – 
particularly in the context of the EU’s eastwards enlargement – have also been 
utilised to illustrate the impact of the EU beyond its own geographical confines 
(e.g. Lippert et al 2001; Goetz 2001b; Grabbe 2003; Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore 2004, 2008). The principle of conditionality - one of the key 
components of the EU’s strategy in post-communist Central and Eastern 
Europe - is widely acknowledged to be the driving force behind the process of 
enlargement-led Europeanisation. Indeed the principle of conditionality, with 
all its multiple guises and methods of application, has attracted a great deal of 
scholarly attention, both in the context of EU enlargement and the wider field 
of the EU’s external relations (see, for example, Pridham, 2002; Smith, 1998, 
2005). Building on a rationalist perspective, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
define conditionality as a ‘bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, 
under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to 
comply with its conditions’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, 662). 
Under this external incentives model, actors are assumed to be utility-
maximisers, whose preferences are determined by ‘cost and benefit’ 
calculations, shaped by four main factors: the clarity of EU conditions; the size 
and speed of rewards; the credibility of threats and promises; and the size of 
adoption costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). 
The ambiguities surrounding the definition and application of externally 
imposed norms on post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe are 
discussed by Hughes et al who argue that EU conditionality is not ‘a uniformly 
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hard rule-based instrument, but rather a highly differentiated one’ (Hughes et 
al, 2004: 256). Indeed, by distinguishing between formal (i.e. based on the 
Copenhagen criteria and the EU’s acquis) and informal (i.e. softer mechanisms 
of applying pressure) conditionality they argue that the transformative effects 
of enlargement-led conditionality depend upon the nature of the EU acquis, the 
policy area concerned and the political context in which conditionality is 
applied. Grabbe argues along similar lines by pointing out that the accession 
conditionality established by the Copenhagen criteria is not always amenable to 
quantitative targets. As a result, the establishment of clear causalities between 
‘compliance’ and ‘reward’ are not always straightforward or free from political 
contestation (Grabbe, 2006).1    
Hence, an understanding of EU enlargement as a purely bureaucratic process of 
rule-based assessment would conceal the significant room for discretion 
available to both the Commission (as the assessor of the performance of 
candidate countries) and the Council (as the ultimate ‘gatekeeper’ in the 
enlargement process). Neither should EU enlargement be understood solely on 
the basis of the ‘rhetorical entrapment’ paradigm (Schimmelfennig, 2001) and 
the inevitability it implies. Indeed, the experience of the Bulgarian and 
Romanian accession to the EU highlighted the strong interplay between, on the 
                                                 
1
  Neither, of course, should all sources of domestic reform be traced exclusively to processes of 
Europeanisation. For example, the eventual accommodation of ethnic minority parties into the 
mainstream of Bulgarian and Romanian politics offers evidence of compliance with the Copenhagen 
democratic criterion that is best attributable to the complexities of the domestic party political scene 
(and the delicate process of governmental coalition building) rather than externally imposed 
conditionalities. Similarly a range of domestic reforms can be best understood by reference to 
international actors (other than the EU) with a stake in the process of domestic reform in the two 
countries, including the International Monetary Fund the World Bank and the World Trade 
Organisation. 
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one hand, the rhetorical commitment to Europe’s reunification and the creation 
of a rule-based process of EU enlargement and, on the other, the need for the 
constant adjustment of the EU’s strategy in the region so as to account for a 
rapidly evolving geo-strategic environment and the very diverse nature of the 
candidate countries knocking on its door. With this in mind, the case of the 
2007 entrants offers three theoretically-informed insights into the process of 
EU enlargement: firstly, it highlights the evolutionary nature of enlargement-
led conditionality and presents evidence of policy learning across different 
waves of EU enlargement; secondly, it demonstrates the difficulties 
surrounding the consistent application of conditionality towards ‘exceptional’ 
candidate countries (whether defined in cultural, historical or security terms); 
and, thirdly, it problematises the causalities between conditionality and 
domestic reform. Put simply, do Bulgaria and Romania prove the effectiveness 
of enlargement-led conditionality or just confirm the limitations of its 
inconsistent application?  The first two points are addressed in the next part of 
the article. The third point is discussed in the conclusion.  
 
3. The Importance of Being Balkan: differentiation and policy 
learning in the EU’s enlargement strategy 
 
Since its very inception in the late 1980s, EU policy towards Central and 
Eastern Europe has balanced (often uncomfortably) two fundamental 
principles: on the one hand, the need for a single policy framework open to all 
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countries in the region that sought to deepen their relations with the EC/EU 
and, on the other, the preservation of an element of differentiation which 
allowed the EU to regulate the range of (and timing of access to) ‘rewards’ 
(contractual, financial etc) available to individual Central and East European 
(CEE) partners. The first principle (i.e. single policy framework) spoke to the 
need for a visible and coherent EU policy towards post-communist Europe 
which would mobilise more effectively the Commission’s financial and 
administrative resources and would insulate the EU from the criticism that its 
commitment to the  region was either lukewarm or selective (in terms of 
preferred partners). The second principle (i.e. differentiation) was born out of 
the conviction that, given the degree of diversity amongst its East European 
partners, the EU should not deal with the region en bloc. Indeed, the placing of 
conditionality (as a mix of threats and rewards) at the heart of the EU’s strategy 
in Central and Eastern Europe necessitated the assessment of individual 
partners on the merits of their reform performance rather than an a priori 
acceptance of their claim to EU membership by virtue of their ‘return to 
Europe’ (e.g. Papadimitriou, 2002). 
The importance of this policy paradigm for the European ambitions of Bulgaria 
and Romania has been profound throughout the past twenty years. Given their 
geographical location and their particular trajectories of post-communist 
transition, the experience of EU differentiation against the two countries can be 
understood by reference to three main axes: iconic acts of differentiation, 
enhanced conditionalities and the securitisation of EU marginalisation.  
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3.1. Iconic acts of differentiation 
The first and more obvious observation relates to the delay (compared with 
Central and Eastern Europe’s frontrunners) with which Bulgaria and Romania 
have ascended the ladder of contractual relations with the EU (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Key Dates in the Process of the EU’s Eastwards Enlargement 
 
Signing of 
TCA 
Signing of 
EA 
Opening of 
Accession 
Negotiations 
Conclusion 
of Accession 
Negotiations 
Signing of 
Accession 
Treaty 
Accession 
Hungary 26.09.89 16.12.91 31.03.1998 13.12.2002 16.04.2003 01.05.2004 
Poland 19.09.89 16.12.91 31.03.1998 13.12.2002 16.04.2003 01.05.2004 
Czechoslovakia 08.05.90 16.12.91 – – – – 
Czech Republic – 04.10.93 31.03.1998 13.12.2002 16.04.2003 01.05.2004 
Slovakia – 04.10.93 15.02.2000 13.12.2002 16.04.2003 01.05.2004 
Bulgaria 08.05.90 08.03.93 15.02.2000 17.12.2004 25.04.2005 01.01.2007 
Romania 22.10.90 01.02.93 15.02.2000 17.12.2004 25.04.2005 01.01.2007 
Estonia 11.05.92 12.06.95 31.03.1998 13.12.2002 16.04.2003 01.05.2004 
Lithuania 11.05.92 12.06.95 15.02.2000 13.12.2002 16.04.2003 01.05.2004 
Latvia 11.05.92 12.06.95 15.02.2000 13.12.2002 16.04.2003 01.05.2004 
Slovenia 05.04.93 10.06.96 31.03.1998 13.12.2002 16.04.2003 01.05.2004 
Source: Own representation. 
 
Although the overthrown of Todor Zhivkov and Nicolae Ceauşescu on 10 
November and 24 December 1989 respectively followed very soon after the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall (9 November), the nature of regime change in both 
Bulgaria and Romania produced a far weaker reform impetus by comparison to 
those witnessed in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The outcome of the 
first multi-party elections in Romania (May 1990) and Bulgaria (June 1990) 
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confirmed Western suspicions that much of the previous communist order had 
remained intact in both countries. In this sense Bulgaria and Romania failed to 
meet the first (implicit) conditionality for advancing their relations with the 
EU: a clean break from their communist past and the emergence of reform-
minded governments.  
The implications of this setback first became evident during the second half of 
1990,2 when the EU revealed its association strategy for the CEE countries. 
Hence, whereas Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were invited to negotiate 
their Europe Agreements with the EU in September 1990, neither Bulgaria nor 
Romania was asked to do so. The two Balkan countries were ‘officially’ 
decoupled from Central and Eastern Europe’s frontrunners As a result, the 
Romanian and Bulgarian Europe Agreements were signed in February and 
March 1993 respectively, over a year later than those between the EU and the 
then ‘Visegrád  Three’.        
From that point onwards the reputation of Bulgaria and Romania as ‘outliers’ 
in the process of the EU’s eastwards enlargement never seriously recovered. 
The publication by the Commission in July 1997 of Agenda 2000 and its 
opinion on the membership applications of the ten CEE countries confirmed 
that the pace of reform in both countries had fallen behind those of the region’s 
frontrunners.3 Indicative of this was the fact that both Bulgaria and Romania 
                                                 
2
  Romania’s relations with the EU were effectively frozen during the summer of 1990 following 
government-sponsored violence against student demonstrations in June 1990.  
3
 The ten CEE countries were: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.    
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were judged to have failed the economic criteria set in Copenhagen, whereas 
Romania and Slovakia were the only candidate countries to have failed to meet 
fully the political criteria (Phinnemore and Papadimitriou, 2008). The 
Commission’s assessment paved the way for the second ‘official’ act of 
differentiation against the two Balkan applicants at the Luxembourg European 
Council in December 1997: Bulgaria and Romania (alongside Latvia, Lithuania 
and Slovakia) were excluded from the accession negotiations that were 
launched in London in March 1998 (Council of the European Union 1997).  
The European Council’s U-turn at Helsinki two years later (December 1999) 
ended the ‘formal’ differentiation amongst East European candidates and 
committed the Union to an all inclusive negotiating process (Council of the 
European Union 1999). Bulgaria and Romania were now in a position to stake 
a much stronger claim to their EU membership credentials. But, unlike the rest 
of the ‘pre-ins’ of Luxembourg, they were unable to make up for the lost time. 
As a result neither Romania nor Bulgaria was amongst the eight East European 
countries who, alongside Cyprus and Malta, participated in the fifth round of 
EU enlargement on 1 May 2004. The two Balkan candidates, by contrast, 
fulfilled their EU membership ambitions 32 months later, on 1 January 2007. 
 
3.2. Enhanced Conditionalities 
If iconic acts of differentiation (like Luxembourg) in the EU’s ‘gate-keeping’ 
policy in Central and Eastern Europe (Grabbe, 2001) have dominated news 
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headlines, more marginal adjustments in the definition and application of EU-
imposed conditionalities have produced a significant cumulative effect on the 
articulation and execution of the EU’s enlargement strategy. Many 
commentators have argued that, given the unprecedented nature (in terms of 
speed, policy coverage and applicant numbers) of eastwards enlargement, much 
of the EU strategy in this field developed incrementally and not always in a 
linear fashion (see for example, Sedelmeier, 2005). This ‘learning by doing’ 
approach to enlargement allowed the EU to revisit and adjust some of the key 
components of its strategy in the region in light of its experiences of dealing 
with the frontrunners of the process, but also in anticipation of the challenges 
likely to emerge in subsequent waves of applicants (see below).            
Much to their frustration, Bulgaria and Romania were first exposed to tighter 
EU conditionalities during the negotiation of their Association agreements in 
1992. Upon the insistence of the EU, the Bulgarian and Romanian Europe 
Agreements included in their preamble a specific ‘human rights clause’ that 
made explicit reference to the protection of minority rights (see Table 2). In 
addition, Article 118 (paragraph 2) of the Final Provisions of the agreements 
included a ‘unilateral suspension clause’ that allowed either party to suspend 
co-operation in case of failure (of the opposite party) to fulfil the obligations 
prescribed in the agreement (Papadimitriou, 2002). As neither clause was 
included in the first set of Europe Agreements with the ‘Visegrád Three’, the 
tightening of political conditionalities for the two Balkan applicants was 
interpreted as a reflection of widespread scepticism in Brussels over the pace of 
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their democratic transitions and the treatment of the substantial Turkish and 
Hungarian minorities in Bulgaria and Romania respectively (the latter being a 
major case for concern).4  
Table 2: Association, Accession and Post-Accession Conditionalities in 
Comparative Perspective 
 2004 2007 
 Hu Po CSFR Cz Slk Lat Lit Est Slo Bu Ro 
Europe Agreement            
Human Rights Clause - - - √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Unilateral Suspension Clause - - - √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
General Economic Safeguard 
Clause 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Sector-Specific Safeguard 
Clauses   
- - - √ √ √ √ √ - √ √ 
Treaty of Accession            
General Economic Safeguard 
Clause 
√ √ n/a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Internal Market Safeguard 
Clause 
√ √ n/a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Third Pillar Safeguard Clause √ √ n/a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Postponement Clause 
(unanimity) 
- - n/a - - - - - - √ √ 
Postponement Clause (QMV) - - n/a - - - - - - - √ 
Post Accession              
Benchmarking - - n/a - - - - - - √ √ 
Source: Own representation. 
 
Calls for enhanced conditionalities and more robust mechanisms of EU 
monitoring grew louder in Brussels as Bulgaria’s and Romania’s membership 
prospects became more real. Evidence of suspicion over the pace of domestic 
reform can be detected in most of the Regular Reports published by the 
Commission since 1997 as well as in almost all European Parliament reports on 
the two countries. These concerns were expressed in the most manifest way in 
                                                 
4
 Elements of policy learning (from the experience of the first round of Europe Agreements) in the 
EU’s trade-related strategy towards Bulgaria and Romania were visible in the insertion of a specific 
safeguard clause on steel products as well as a more cautious trade liberalisation timetable on 
agricultural products.    
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the Treaty of Accession governing Bulgaria and Romania’s accession that was 
signed on 25 April 2005 (Official Journal, 2005b). As was the case with all 
2004 entrants, the Treaty of Accession  included three safeguard clauses: a 
‘general’ economic safeguard clause allowed EU member states (as well as the 
two members-to-be) to apply to the Commission for authorisation to take 
protective measures in case of ‘serious deterioration in the economic situation 
of a given area’ (applicable for a period of up to three years following 
accession); and two ‘specific’ safeguard clauses relating to the internal market 
and third pillar issues (such as cooperation in criminal and civil matters) which 
allowed the Commission or individual member-states (in the case of the JHA 
safeguard clause) to take ‘appropriate measures’ in cases where Bulgaria and/or 
Romania fail to meet the membership obligations. The time frame for the 
activation of the two specific safeguard clauses went beyond the first three 
years following accession, extending for ‘as long as the relevant commitments 
have not been fulfilled’ (Official Journal, 2005a).                 
Unlike the 2004 entrants, however, the Bulgaria’s and Romania’s Accession 
treaties included an additional ‘postponement clause’, according to which: 
‘if…. there is clear evidence that the state of preparations for adoption and 
implementation of the acquis in Bulgaria or Romania is such that there is a serious risk 
of either of those States being manifestly unprepared to meet the requirements of 
membership by the date of accession of 1 January 2007 in a number of important areas, 
the Council may, acting unanimously on the basis of a Commission recommendation, 
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decide that the date of accession of that State is postponed by one year to 1 January 
2008’ (Official Journal, 2005a: Article 39).  
 For Romania the scope of enhanced conditionality went even further by 
allowing the Council to activate the postponement clause by qualified majority 
voting if Romania’s progress towards implementing eleven specific areas of the 
acquis was not satisfactory (see Table 2).5  
The Commission’s monitoring procedures during the ratification process of the 
Treaty of Accession were also significantly tightened. For the 2004 entrants the 
publication of the Commission’s Comprehensive Monitoring Reports in 
November 2003 raised a number of outstanding issues to be resolved before 
formal accession.6 In the absence of a ‘postponement clause’, however, these 
reports were widely regarded as a ‘tidying up exercise’ rather than a serious 
threat for derailing the agreed accession date of 1 May 2004. For Bulgaria and 
Romania, the stakes were much higher. Between April 2005 and January 2007, 
the Commission published three such monitoring reports; a clear sign that 
Brussels was anxious not to let the two Balkan applicants ‘off the hook’ easily. 
In the first monitoring report published in October 2005 the Commission 
                                                 
5
  The 11 policy areas stipulated in Annex IX of the Accession Treaty were: 1) the implementation of 
the Schengen Action Plan; 2) control and surveillance at the future external borders of the Union; 3) the 
implementation of the Action Plan and Strategy for the Reform of the Judiciary; 4) the enforcement of 
anti-corruption legislation and the effective independence of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutors' 
Office (NAPO); 5) the full implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy; 6) improvements 
in the operations of the gendarmerie and the police; 7) the implementation of the strategy to protect 
victims of trafficking; 8) further investigations into accusations of state aid to the energy sector; 9) the 
strengthening of the State aid enforcement record; 10) the submission of a revised steel restructuring 
plan and 11) the strengthening of the financial means and human resources of the Competition Council. 
See Official Journal (2005b). 
6
 The number of outstanding issues varied across candidate countries: there were nine for Poland; six 
for Malta; four for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia; three for Estonia; two for Lithuania and 
one for Slovenia.  
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concluded that neither country was able to cope fully with the competitive 
pressures of the Single European Market (one of the Copenhagen criteria) and 
identified various areas of ‘serious concern’ for Bulgaria (16) and Romania 
(14) (European Commission, 2005a; European Commission, 2005b).7  
By the time the second monitoring report was published in May 2006 the areas 
of ‘serious [EU] concern’ were reduced to six for Bulgaria and four for 
Romania.8 As regards the Single Market criterion the Commission concluded 
that both countries would be able to fulfil it in the ‘near term’, subject to the 
‘continuation’ (for Bulgaria) and ‘vigorous implementation’ (for Romania) of 
their respective reform programmes (European Commission, 2006a; 2006b). 
Despite its more positive overtone, however, the Commission’s report fell short 
                                                 
7
  For Bulgaria these can be summarised as follows: protection of intellectual and industrial property 
rights in the company law field and motor vehicle insurance in the services chapter; the paying agency 
and the integrated administration and control system; the common market organisation on milk; 
transmissible spongiforme encephalopathies (TSEs) and animal by-products; the veterinary control 
system and animal diseases control; trade in live animals and animal products; veterinary public health 
and animal welfare in the chapter on agriculture; institutional structures and financial management and 
control in the area of regional policy; application of the Schengen acquis; management of the future EU 
external border; police cooperation; and fight against organised crime and fraud and corruption. See 
European Commission (2005a). For Romania these can be summarised as follows: public procurement 
in free movement of goods; protection of intellectual and industrial property rights in company law; 
setting up of  paying agencies and implementation of an integrated administration and control system; 
measures relating to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) and animal by-products; 
veterinary control system in the internal market; animal disease control measures; veterinary public 
health; administrative capacity in the taxation area; strengthening of institutional structures and 
financial management and control mechanisms to deal with regional policy; coordination of structural 
instruments; industrial pollution and overall administrative capacity in the field of environment; 
application of the Schengen acquis; management of the future EU external border; fight against fraud 
and corruption. See European Commission (2005b). 
8
 For Bulgaria these were: a) the setting up an integrated administration and control system (IACS) in 
agriculture; b) the build-up of rendering collection and treatment facilities in line with the acquis on 
TSE and animal by-products; c) clearer evidence of results in investigating and prosecuting organised 
crime networks; d) more effective and efficient implementation of laws for the fight against fraud and 
corruption; e) intensified enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions; f) strengthened financial 
control for the future use of structural and cohesion funds. See European Commission (2006a). For 
Romania these were: a) fully operational paying agencies accredited for handling direct payments to 
farmers and operators; b) setting up an  integrated administration and control system (IACS) in 
agriculture; c) build-up of rendering collection and treatment facilities in line with the acquis on TSE 
and animal by-products; d) tax administration IT systems ready for inter-operability with those of the 
rest of the Union, to enable a correct collection of VAT throughout the EU internal market. See 
European Commission (2006b) 
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of recommending to the Council 1 January 2007 as the target date of accession. 
Instead the final decision on this matter would be taken in the light of another 
(third) monitoring report scheduled for September/October 2006. This was an 
astonishing act of brinkmanship by the European Commission. The date of 
Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession into the EU would not be made known to 
the two applicants until three months before it was due to take place. 
Indeed the confirmation of the 1 January 2007 accession date in the 
Commission’s report (26 September 2006) was welcomed with jubilation (and 
a great deal of relief) by Bulgarian and Romanian policy-makers. Their 
‘victory’, however, had come at a high cost; namely the acceptance of an 
unprecedented series of post-accession conditionalities that allowed the 
Commission to monitor Bulgaria’s and Romania’s compliance with the acquis 
even after the two countries had formally acceded into the EU (European 
Commission, 2006c). The so-called ‘cooperation and verification process’, 
whose full operational details were finalised by two Commission decisions in 
December 2006 (European Commission, 2006d; European Commission, 
2006e), had its legal base in the safeguard clauses provided for in the 
Romanian and Bulgarian Accession Treaties (particularly those prescribed in 
articles 37 and 38). The ‘cooperation and verification mechanism’ set a series 
of benchmarks (six for Bulgaria and four for Romania) to be regularly 
monitored by the European Commission (twice-annually).9 Failure to comply 
                                                 
9 The benchmarks for Bulgaria were: a) adopt constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity 
regarding the independence and accountability of the judicial system; b) ensure a more transparent and 
efficient judicial process by adopting and implementing a new judicial system act and the new civil 
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with these benchmarks carried the threat of major sanctions, including the 
withdrawal of EU funding and the unilateral suspension of bilateral cooperation 
with other EU member states on judicial matters.  
The introduction of post-accession conditionalities in the 2007 enlargement 
was a major example of policy innovation reflecting both the ‘Balkan 
exceptionalism’ of the two new EU member states and the Commission’s 
ability to learn and adjust its enlargement strategy in view of changing realities 
on the ground. Since Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession, the Commission has 
published three ‘Cooperation and Verification’ reports for each of the two new 
member states (European Commission 2007a; 2007b; 2008a; 2008b, 2008c, 
2008d). The fallout of these reports has already been acutely felt, particularly in 
Bulgaria which has recently suffered the withdrawal of €220 million of EU 
funding because of its persistent failure to tackle corruption (See European 
Commission 2008e, 2008f; EUobserver 2008; Euractiv 2008a, 2008b). The 
implications of post-accession conditionalities for the design and execution of 
                                                                                                                                            
procedure code. Report on the impact of these new laws and of the penal and administrative procedure 
codes, notably on the pre-trial phase; c) continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance 
professionalism, accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the 
results annually; d) conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of 
high-level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the publication of 
assets of high-level officials; e) take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at 
the borders and within local government; f) implement a strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on 
serious crime, money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report 
on new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas. See European 
Commission (2006d). The benchmarks for Romania were: a) ensure a more transparent and efficient 
judicial process notably by enhancing the capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of 
Magistracy. Report and monitor the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes; b) establish, as 
foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, incompatibilities and potential 
conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can 
be taken; c) continue to conduct professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level 
corruption; d) take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within the 
local government. See European Commission (2006e). 
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future rounds of EU enlargement will be discussed in more detail in the 
concluding section of this article.  
 
3.3. The ‘Securitisation’ of EU Marginalisation     
An understanding of Bulgaria and Romania’s ‘Balkan exceptionalism’ as an 
exclusively EU-driven discourse leading to discrimination and the imposition 
of enhanced conditionalities against the 2007 entrants fails to encapsulate fully 
the complexities of their relationship with the EU since 1989. Indeed claims to 
the exceptionalism of their own countries have often been employed by 
Bulgarian and Romanian political elites themselves in order to advance their 
European ambitions. Within this context major security crises such as the 
outbreak of the wars of succession in former Yugoslavia in Spring 1991 or the 
coup against Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union in August 1991 became 
powerful bargaining cards in the hands of the Bulgarian and Romanian 
governments in getting the EU to speed up their inclusion into the Association 
process (Papadimitriou, 2002). In later years, references to the fragility of their 
own imperfect democracies and their potential implosion into Balkan instability 
have also helped the two countries to resist the danger of more a permanent 
form of isolation from the European mainstream (Phinnemore, 2000). For 
Romania, in particular, its especially traumatic communist experience (the 
‘Ceauşescu factor’) and its population size (‘too big to be ignored’) and have 
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often been used as part of an exceptionalist discourse to account for the slow 
pace of post-communist reform and promote fast-track accession into the EU.            
The effectiveness of ‘securitising’ the (threat of) marginalisation from the EU’s 
enlargement process was most clearly demonstrated in the aftermath of the 
1997 decision of the Luxembourg European Council not to open fast-track 
accession negotiations with the two countries. The entanglement of the 
Romanian and Bulgarian EU and NATO membership applications with the 
escalating crisis in Kosovo and the unresolved issue of Turkey’s European 
perspective produced a powerful incentive for the revision of the EU’s 
enlargement strategy. By the time the EU’s U-turn was completed at Helsinki 
(December 1999), Bulgaria and (particularly) Romania’s admission into the 
‘fast lane’ of the enlargement process was much more a reflection of a new EU 
security thinking for the wider Balkan region (as well as a reward for their 
crucial support to NATO during the Kosovo war) rather than a simple 
technocratic appraisal of the reform record in the two countries (significant as 
that was for Bulgaria at the time).         
The U-turn at Helsinki also highlighted the fact that, for all of its flaws in terms 
of definition and execution, the EU’s differentiation principle within its 
enlargement strategy did not produce ‘stable’ groups of ‘frontrunners’ and 
‘laggards’ across Central and Eastern Europe. The rapid progression of relative 
‘latecomers’, such as the Baltic States or Slovenia, in the enlargement process 
is an indicative example. Similarly, the ability of marginalised candidates (such 
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as Slovakia in the mid-1990s) to catch up with the ‘frontrunners’ and meet the 
2004 target date also illustrates that there was nothing ‘pre-determined’ or 
‘inevitable’ about Bulgaria’s and Romania’s late accession to the European 
Union. This is a point often overlooked by political elites in both Sofia and 
Bucharest who regularly attribute the sources of this delay to external factors 
rather than the extensive network of veto points to reform in their own 
countries. 
 
4. Conclusion: policy legacies and future implications – looking back 
to see forward 
Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession into the European Union on 1 January 
2007 is the culmination of a long and often difficult relationship that is 
inextricably linked to the complexities of post-communist transition in the two 
countries and the evolutionary nature of the EU’s enlargement strategy. The 
empirical, conceptual and normative implications of the 2007 enlargement are 
not always easily discernable, shaped, as they are, by unclear causalities and 
ambiguous yardsticks for evaluating success. At one level, the delayed entry of 
the two countries into the EU can be read as a confirmation of their ‘Balkan 
exceptionalism’; their slower reform performance vis-à-vis the 2004 entrants 
and the resilience of their domestic veto points to the adaptational pressures of 
enlargement-led Europeanisation. A similar line of argumentation may also 
suggest that Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession into the EU is not the result of 
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an ‘objective’ assessment of their compliance with EU conditionalities, but 
rather a reflection of wider security imperatives which led the EU to allow the 
accession of ‘imperfect’ new member states instead of risking the unpredictable 
costs of their exclusion. The introduction of post-accession safeguards against 
non-compliance by the two Balkan countries would also be seen under a 
similar perspective. 
Where does this leave enlargement-led conditionality? Does the inconsistent 
application of conditionality negate its very raison d’être? The Bulgarian and 
Romanian experience suggests that the EU’s leverage in promoting domestic 
reform has been greatly enhanced when the prospect of membership appeared 
more credible to the candidate countries. The evident marginalisation of the 
two countries during the first half of the 1990s failed to produce strong reform 
coalitions on the ground. The progress witnessed in the two countries since 
Helsinki (1999) reinforces the point that EU conditionality works more 
effectively by reference to the anticipated rewards for compliance rather than 
an opportunity for domestic elites to reflect on failure. This reality, likely to 
become even more evident as the EU expands into the Western Balkans and 
Turkey, is not without its moral hazards. Above all, it highlights the fact that 
the mix of rewards and threats (the essence of conditionality) at the disposal of 
the European Union through its enlargement strategy may produce different 
‘Pareto optimal’ points in different candidate countries. This, in turn, suggests 
that the exercise of discretion (over the timing, scope and application of 
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conditionality) will remain a crucial element of the EU’s engagement with 
candidate countries in the future. 
Indeed processes of learning and policy entrepreneurship that developed within 
the context of the 2007 enlargement are already evident in the Commission’s 
approach to the Western Balkans and Turkey. Additional conditionalities such 
as the ‘good neighbourliness’ clause and the full co-operation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal on former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are already 
being imposed on the new wave of accession applicants. The mechanism of 
benchmarking, first developed in the context of the Romanian and Bulgarian 
post-accession verification process, is now being implemented for each chapter 
of the EU’s acquis under negotiation. Crucially, with the exception of 
Croatia,10 the EU has refused to set target dates for the completion of its 
accession negotiations with the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey, 
stressing instead that the process of enlargement is ‘open-ended’ and without a 
‘pre-determined outcome’. Many (e.g. Barysch, 2006) are also predicting new 
forms of EU membership where future entrants may be permanently excluded 
from certain aspects of the EU’s acquis.   
Whether these declarations are best understood as evidence of ‘strategic 
adjustment’ to the EU’s enlargement policy or as a more ‘paradigmatic shift’ in 
the EU’s appetite for further expansion remains to be seen. Few would deny, 
however, that the current discourse on enlargement is indeed very different to 
                                                 
10
  The European Commission has set the end of 2009 as the target date for the completion of its 
accession negotiations with Croatia.    
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the one that led to the accession of 12 Southern and Central and Eastern 
European countries into the EU in 2004-7. This is bound to have an effect on 
the impact of enlargement-led Europeanisation in the Western Balkans and 
Turkey. Whereas Bulgaria and Romania (as well as the new members in 2004) 
were encouraged to comply with EU conditionalities safe in the knowledge that 
their accession was, in principle, agreed upon, current candidate countries are 
forced to pursue their adaptation to the EU acquis without such a clear EU 
membership perspective. The absence of clear ‘reward’, however, may hinder 
the emergence of a sustainable reform impetus in the region and seriously 
damage the EU’s ability to guide more countries away from their ‘Balkan 
exceptionalism’ and into the European mainstream. 
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